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Abstract
As women take on a continuously larger role in the legal field, 
it has become tremendously important to study and understand 
the impact women are having on the judicial system. This 
work explores the role of women in the judiciary. Specifically, 
I examine the Supreme Court of the United States to find 
out whether women’s jurisprudence differs from that of their 
male colleagues. For this paper, I limit my examination to 
cases involving equal protection under the law. The theory I 
employ is that of Carol Gilligan, who argues that across many 
realms, women have a uniquely different voice than men 
(1982). Through a quantitative analysis of 49 cases dealing 
with issues of equal protection under the law, I show that 
Gilligan’s theory helps us understand how cases are decided 
in the United States Supreme Court. Additionally, I show how 
the “Different Voice” model improves upon existing models 
of judicial decision making by Lee Epstein, Jeffrey Segal, and 
Harold Spaeth. This paper expands current gender and politics 
literature, which had previously used Gilligan’s insights 
to examine U.S. state legislatures, by analyzing decision 
making in the Supreme Court. This paper thus illustrates that 
women, due to their unique life experiences, have a different 
understanding of the law in regards to equality and equal 
protection under the law.
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E Q U A L  P R O T E C T I O N  U N D E R  T H E  L A W : 
Do Female Justices Have a Different Voice?
INTRODUCTION
This paper examines how female justices view and 
articulate individual rights and the implications of the 
“Feminine Voice Model” (Maveety, 1996) regarding 
equal protection under law in America. More women are 
entering the legal profession, which may be expected to 
lead to more female judges at all levels of the American 
judicial system. Women used to be 9% of law school 
students, but as of 2010 comprise 47% of law school 
enrollment (American Bar Association, 2011). Further, the 
two most recent appointments to the Supreme Court of 
the United States have produced a 3 to 6 ratio of women 
to men on the court. I will show that this increase in 
participation by women in the legal field has resulted in a 
clear trend toward equality as a social norm as female law 
scholars tend to fight for these rights as lawyers and rule 
on them as judges.
I examine cases during the Rehnquist Era (1994–2004), 
focusing on the judgments of Justice O’Connor and 
Justice Ginsburg—comparing their opinions, concurring 
opinions, and dissenting opinions. I demonstrate how 
O’Connor and Ginsburg sought to defend equal protection 
during their tenure together. Through the examination 
of their judgments I illustrate that their decisions were 
based in part on the Feminine Voice Model (Maveety, 
1996). This model suggests that “Women’s judgments 
are tied to feelings of empathy and compassion” based 
upon past experiences (Gilligan, 1982, p. 69). I argue that 
the Feminine Voice Model is the key identifier as to why 
female U.S. Supreme Court Justices, who exhibit different 
religious backgrounds and theoretically opposing political 
ideologies, still arrived at the same legal conclusions in a 
majority of cases regarding equal protection.
This paper presents three central findings. First, with 
regards to equal protection under the law, O’Connor and 
Ginsburg rule together in a majority of cases (65%) to 
uphold equal protection and expand equal rights. Second, 
when O’Connor and Ginsburg rule separately (35% of 
Figure 1. The four women who have served on the Supreme 
Court of the United States. From left to right: Justice Sandra 
Day O’Connor (Ret.), Justice Sonia Sotomayor, Justice Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg, and Justice Elena Kagan in the Justices’ 
Conference Room, prior to Justice Kagan’s Investiture 
Ceremony on October 1, 2010. Photo courtesy of the 
Collection of the Supreme Court of the United States.
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cases), they both seek to support equal protection under 
the law. Finally, this paper shows that in cases regarding 
gender equality, O’Connor and Ginsburg have the 
strongest opinions and are more likely than their male 
counterparts to rule and work together to protect the 
rights of women. 
Feminine Voice Model
The Feminine Voice Model has become a serious 
contender in untangling and understanding what kind 
of ideology women bring to the world of politics. Since 
Carol Gilligan released her book In a Different Voice 
in 1982, scholars have extended her initial examination 
of differences between men and women in regards to 
morality, rights, and law to question whether the model 
applies to those in governmental roles.
For example, Lyn Kathlene applied Gilligan’s ideas to 
women who hold legislative positions. Kathlene points 
out that the political field is one dominated by males and 
masculine concepts. Thus, the influence of women in 
the political realm requires further research in order to 
fully note how women have changed or impacted law 
and policy (Kathlene, 2005). Kathlene highlights the key 
differences between men and women regarding creating 
new laws. By examining the differences between men 
and women as Kathlene outlines, I will show how this 
theory can be applied to women in the judiciary in their 
interpretation of laws.
Kathlene (2005) makes a distinction between masculine 
and feminine approaches to law (Table 1). The masculine 
approach is defined as an “ethic of justice” (p. 215). 
Men typically see people as being self-interested and in 
competition with one another. The masculine approach 
suggests men prioritize individual rights, but have a strong 
tendency to support the rights of the majority (p. 216).
Women, on the other hand, exhibit an “ethic of care”. 
Kathlene writes, “Women are more concerned with 
the interworking of society and the interconnectedness 
of people” (2005, p. 216). This implies that women 
address the needs of society by upholding the equality 
of individuals before individual rights. However, as a 
consequence of protecting equal rights, women do a 
greater job than men of protecting individual rights. 
Acting under the “ethic of care,” women’s main objective 
is to create a society that guarantees all people equal 
protection under the law.
Baines discusses the expansion of Gilligan’s ideas to the 
interpretation of law. She points to the work of Katharine 
T. Bartlett, who suggested that female justices exhibit 
“feminist practical reasoning” (as cited in Baines, 
2009, p. 34). Unlike other forms of practical reasoning, 
“feminist practical reasoning takes its direction from 
facts, experiences, and contexts” (Baines, 2009, p. 36). 
Baines’ analysis is in agreement with other legal scholars 
such as Sherry and Sharon Rush, who hold female justices 
are more likely than male justices to decide cases using 
contextual analysis (as cited in Baines, 2009, p. 35).
Alternative Approaches 
Other models for judicial decision making include 
the “Attitudinal Model” and the “Legal Model.” The 
Attitudinal Model suggests that Supreme Court Justices 
decide cases based on their personal moral convictions, 
political ideology, societal norms, and political obligations 
(Segal & Spaeth, 2002). The Legal Model asserts that 
judicial decision making is generated from a strict 
textual interpretation of law and legal doctrine, generated 
from past cases (George & Epstein, 1992). This view of 
judicial decision making has been labeled as “mechanical 
jurisprudence, because the process by which judges 
reach a decision is highly structured . . . it consists of 
Ethic of Justice Ethic of Care
• View self as autonomous
• Human interactions are separate and competitive
• Distinguishes difference between subjective and 
objective knowledge, favors objective
• Main focus is on addressing individual rights 
• Views self in connection with community/others
• Human interactions are part of a continuous web of 
relationships
• Integrates objective and subjective knowledge, but 
believes both have a bias
• Main focus is on addressing needs/equality  
Table 1. Masculine approach (Ethic of Justice)/Feminine approach (Ethic of Care). After Kathlene, 2005.
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Figure 2. Sandra Day O’Connor, U.S. Supreme Court justice. 
Photo courtesy of the Collection of the Supreme Court of the 
United States.
Figure 3. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, U.S. Supreme Court justice. 
Photo courtesy of the Collection of the Supreme Court of the 
United States.
three steps (1) observation of similarity between cases, 
(2) announcement of the rule of law in the first case, and 
(3) application of that law in the second case” (George & 
Epstein, 1992, p. 324).
In the examination of the jurisprudence of O’Connor and 
Ginsburg, bits of the Attitudinal Model and Legal Model 
will be evident. This is because the Feminine Voice Model 
encompasses many of the characteristics represented in 
these two models; I will demonstrate how these views are 
combined in the Feminine Voice Model in a way that is 
applicable to and apparent in Ginsburg and O’Connor.
METHODS
The remainder of the paper contains two substantive 
sections and conclusions. The first section is an in-depth 
analysis of the jurisprudence of O’Connor and Ginsburg. 
In this section, I compare and contrast their different 
ideologies, illustrating the Feminine Voice Model. I then 
analyze the judgments of O’Connor and Ginsburg in 
landmark cases concerning abortion and discrimination. 
This section demonstrates how they derived a ruling 
and whether there is evidence showing that the outcome 
fits within the Feminine Voice Model. This research 
highlights where O’Connor and Ginsburg differentiate in 
areas of substantive due process, judicial restraint, judicial 
independence, and judicial activism.
The second section of this paper consists of quantitative 
analysis. This data is composed of all cases regarding 
equal protection of rights that occurred between 1994 and 
2005. For this research, equal protection of rights refers to 
those rights that aren’t explicitly listed in the Bill of Rights 
(such as discrimination, privacy, sexual harassment, 
and choice). These rights typically fall under the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In 
examining these cases I record how often Ginsburg and 
O’Connor ruled similarly and differently in order to 
demonstrate that there is a common theme represented by 
both of them in upholding equal protection of law.
Jurisprudence 
O’Connor has been revered as the moderate centrist of 
the Rehnquist Era, typically being the fifth vote in the 
majority of 5-4 decisions (Domino, 2010). O’Connor’s use 
of precedent in accordance with conservative approaches 
to fundamental rights (Maveety, 1996) and application 
of the Equal Protection Clause illuminates her role as 
a preserver of equal rights for all. O’Connor supports 
judicial activism that is both conservatively and liberally 
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motivated, but she tempers this activism by narrowing the 
decisions, refusing to issue any broad principles (Keck, 
2004). This type of ruling shows that O’Connor does 
not fall into either of the aforementioned approaches as 
she is not ruling in a manner that is solely based on her 
personal/political beliefs or precedent. O’Connor’s use 
of these many different judicial practices demonstrates 
feminine legal reasoning, a key component in the 
Feminine Voice Model. 
O’Connor frequently writes her own opinions as a way 
to assert her judicial independence, assuring that her 
decision is fully understood as to how she interprets 
the Constitution (Maveety, 2008). O’Connor tries to 
avoid substantive due process, viewing her job as a 
justice as “interpreting and applying law not making 
it” (Nomination of S. D. O’Connor, 1981). This is a key 
difference between her and Ginsburg. Ginsburg believes 
that the development of rights had been embedded in the 
Supreme Court’s history and it is the obligation of the 
Court to continue to define and protect the rights of all 
citizens (Nomination of R. B. Ginsburg, 1993). 
Much like O’Connor, Ginsburg is known for representing 
centrist ideologies. Ginsburg effectively avoids labels such 
as conservative or liberal. Rather she is “a conservative by 
maintaining our oldest ideals and a liberal by beckoning 
us into the new world” (Merritt & Liebermann, 2004,  
p. 48). It is this jurisprudence that is continually displayed 
in her rulings to uphold all rights, thus maintaining a 
commitment to opportunity and equality for all (Merritt 
& Liebermann, 2004). It is clear that the jurisprudence 
represented by both O’Connor and Ginsburg corresponds 
to the Feminine Voice Model insofar as both justices view 
it as their responsibility to protect these rights. This is 
because female judges empathize with the situation of 
having been denied certain rights, based on belonging  
to a marginalized group in society.
Case Analysis: Abortion
Another critical indicator on how these justices view 
equality comes from their thoughts on abortion with 
respect to the Constitution. While neither Ginsburg nor 
O’Connor sat on the Court for Roe v. Wade, they both 
hold distinct views on what this case truly meant for 
abortion entitlement. Both O’Connor and Ginsburg found 
the finding of Roe to be insufficient. Ginsburg thought 
that Roe didn’t fully give women the personal freedom 
to choose; every act of abortion according to Roe was 
a decision that couldn’t be made solely by the women; 
rather, that choice must be made in concurrence with her 
physician (Garrow, 1998). O’Connor, on the other hand, 
found a problem with the rationale used to determine 
when a pregnancy could be aborted (Garrow, 1998). She 
said, “The Roe framework is clearly on a collision course 
with itself . . . and there is no justification in law or logic 
for the trimester framework” (Garrow, 1998, p. 645).
When O’Connor ruled on abortion in Planned Parenthood 
v. Casey (1992), she followed character and decided the 
case based on stare decisis, upholding the central finding 
of Roe. However, she took this chance to move away from 
the medically focused decision to establish abortion as 
a right that favors the equality of women. In a plurality 
opinion, O’Connor, along with Kennedy and Souter, wrote, 
“. . . choices central to personal dignity and autonomy 
are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment” (Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 1992). 
A year after Casey, Ginsburg was questioned about her 
views on abortion during her confirmation hearing. The 
Senate was concerned with whether she believed abortion 
was a matter of both equal protection and individual 
autonomy (Nomination of R. B. Ginsburg, 1993). She 
responded as follows:
The decision whether or not to bear a child 
is a central to a women’s life, her well being, 
and her dignity . . . when government controls 
this decision for her she is being treated as less 
than a fully adult human responsible for her 
choices . . . as well if the government imposes 
restraints that impede a women’s right to choose 
it is disadvantaging her, because of her sex. 
(Nomination of R. B. Ginsburg, 1993) 
O’Connor and Ginsburg ruled together for the first time 
in 2000 to uphold abortions rights in Stenberg v. Carhart 
(2000). Both Ginsburg and O’Connor wrote concurring 
opinions on this, making almost identical claims that the 
Nebraska regulation was in violation of the past precedent 
founded in Casey, and it placed an undue burden on 
women when trying to obtain an abortion (Stenberg v. 
Carhart, 2000). 
In 2007, Ginsburg was faced with revisiting abortion in 
Gonzalez v. Carhart, which challenged the 2003 Partial-
Birth Abortion Ban Act. In her dissenting opinion, 
Ginsburg upheld the views she had openly expressed 
during her confirmation hearing and in writings previous 
to her appointment. She claimed that by allowing for 
the partial-birth abortion ban to stand, the Court was 
“chipping away at a right declared again and again by 
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the Court” (Gonzalez v. Carhart, 2007). These cases, 
opinions, and thoughts on abortion are all intertwined 
with autonomy of the individual and the equality of 
women, all of which exclusively relate to the concepts in 
the Feminine Voice Model. 
Case Analysis: Discrimination 
In the area of discrimination O’Connor and Ginsburg 
sought to defend equality of people based on gender, 
race, and sexual orientation. However, in these cases 
the differences between O’Connor and Ginsburg are 
illuminated. When examining their rulings in these cases, 
we find that they occasionally wind up on different sides. 
With further investigation into their rulings it is clear that 
they are both trying to protect equality for minorities, but 
their views differ. 
The landmark decision of United States v. Virginia 
(1996) exemplifies this and the Feminine Voice Model. 
United States v. Virginia challenged the Virginia Military 
Institution’s (VMI) male-only status, as it was a public 
institution receiving state and federal funding. VMI 
argued that it must remain open exclusively to men to 
preserve the integrity of the university as the programs 
would have to be altered in order to admit women. VMI 
also argued that it had established a program exclusively 
for women that paralleled that of VMI. Ginsburg wrote 
the majority opinion, with which O’Connor concurred, 
that, “We hold that Virginia has violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s equal protection clause. Because the 
remedy proffered by Virginia—the Mary Baldwin 
VWIL—doesn’t cure the Constitutional violation i.e. 
it does not provide equal opportunity” (United States 
v. Virginia, 1996). She follows with a response to the 
claim that VMI would have to modify its program in 
this statement: “Equal protection as it applies to gender 
classification means state actors may not rely on overly 
broad generalizations” (United States v. Virginia, 1996). 
The language used by Ginsburg throughout this decision 
supports Gilligan's model. In a recent interview Ginsburg 
talked about the VMI decision, stating that discrimination 
based on sex is completely unacceptable in today’s time 
and women are to be regarded as equal to men in all 
capacities of life (Ginsburg, 2011). 
Discrimination based on one’s sexual orientation is still a 
challenge for today’s Court as it faces questions regarding 
the right to gay marriage. Lawrence v. Texas (2003) and 
Romer v. Evans (1996) are key cases in the establishment 
of precedent regarding the equality of LGBT rights. In 
these cases both Ginsburg and O’Connor sought to protect 
the rights of homosexuals from government intrusion. 
However, in Boy Scouts of America et al. v. Dale (2000), 
the Court deviated from the precedent set by Romer. 
Ginsburg and O’Connor ruled differently in this case 
as they disagreed in how far the Constitution could be 
extended to protect equality. O’Connor sided with the 
majority, but in examining the logic within the opinion it 
can be argued that she was still acting in association with 
the Feminine Voice Model. The majority decision claimed 
that the Boy Scouts’ refusal for Dale to be a scout leader 
due to his sexual orientation did not violate the Fourteenth 
Amendment as the Boy Scouts is a private organization that 
exercises outside the governmental realm and is protected 
by the First Amendment’s right of association (Boy Scouts 
of America et al. v. Dale, 2000). By siding with the majority 
O’Connor was protecting the rights of one group that was 
just as fundamental as Dale’s right. Ginsburg, on the other 
hand, was more concerned with the rights of Dale than the 
rights of the Boy Scouts. Thus, both were acting within the 
bounds of the Feminine Voice Model.
The prior examples demonstrate that O’Connor and 
Ginsburg desire to expand and protect equality of rights 
for all. Their ideologies clearly portray Gilligan’s notion 
that, “Changes in women’s rights change women’s 
moral judgments and reasoning with justice by enabling 
women to make judgments that are more tolerant and less 
absolute” (1982, p. 149). 
RESULTS 
Table 2 shows that areas of sexual harassment, right 
to privacy/choice, disability discrimination, and 
governmental discrimination have the highest percent 
difference between the number of times O’Connor and 
Ginsburg decided together and the number of times they 
ruled separately. While Ginsburg certainly took a more 
predominant and emphatic view on the rights of those 
with disabilities, which is demonstrated in her majority 
opinion in Olmstead v. L. C. (Bagenstos, 2004), O’Connor 
joined her in expanding rights and the equal protection 
of law to the disabled. O’Connor and Ginsburg desired 
for people to recognize that those with disabilities should 
be regarded as equals (Bagenstos, 2004). They saw 
these cases as a way to expand equality for handicapped 
individuals in the workplace, schools, and other public/
governmental entities. In doing this they established a role 
in society for people with disabilities, demonstrating that 
they should be regarded and viewed as ordinary citizens. 
The Rehnquist Court faced a higher percentage of sexual 
harassment cases than previous courts as the third wave 
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of the feminist movement was underway. O’Connor and 
Ginsburg both faced the difficulty of sexual harassment 
in the early stages of their careers (Maveety, 1996; 
Ginsburg, 2011). Their strong stances on eliminating 
sexual harassment toward women may well be a result 
of the troubles they faced in their own careers. They also 
view sexual harassment as a way to keep women under 
male control. Ginsburg wrote, “The equal dignity of 
individuals is part of the constitutional legacy” (Merritt 
& Liebermann, 2004, p. 39). O’Connor and Ginsburg 
undoubtedly view derogatory treatment toward women 
as a violation of their personal dignity that needs 
Constitutional protection to ensure the equality of women. 
The right to privacy and choice holds a variety of 
implications and could have been classified with 
governmental discrimination cases, but I found that these 
cases posited questions that are critical to one’s being and 
should be viewed independently. These cases go beyond 
the realm of equality and tap into the arena of personal 
autonomy. As seen in the Feminine Voice Model, men 
are typically more concerned with individual autonomy 
(Kathlene, 2005), but as Gilligan demonstrated, as women 
gain more rights they begin to see themselves as individual 
actors in society and begin to protect rights in that degree 
(Gilligan, 1982). This also demonstrates that women’s 
judgments are not tied to a moral conviction: as O’Connor 
stated in her confirmation hearing, she is morally opposed 
to abortion (Nomination of S. D. O’Connor, 1981), yet she 
continually upheld a woman’s right to choose. These cases 
also demonstrate equating women with men by putting 
them in control of their own bodies. 
The area I found most interesting was racial 
discrimination and affirmative action. This is the only 
area where the number of times they opposed each other 
superseded the times they ruled similarly. However, a 
careful reading of the opinions they wrote in a few of 
these cases, such as Grutter v. Bollinger (2003), Gratz v. 
Bollinger (2003), and Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña 
(1995), shows they were both trying to protect equality 
through different outlets. 
As shown in Table 2, in total, O'Connor and Ginsburg 
ruled similarly 66% of the time in cases regarding the 
equal protection of law; this demonstrates that even 
though they come from different political and religious 
backgrounds, they value the equality of the individual. 
This is reiterated by opinions they have written as 
both O’Connor and Ginsburg asserted their judicial 
independence in numerous cases regarding equal 
protection under the law.
CONCLUSION
This paper shows that the Feminine Voice Model applies 
to female justices when hearing cases that involve equal 
protection under law; there are three main findings 
that support this claim. First, in cases regarding equal 
Table 2. O’Connor/Ginsburg voting similarities and differences in equal protection cases. Composed from 49 Supreme Court cases 
regarding equal protection of law from 1994–2005. 
Types of Cases Decided Together Decided Separately
Sexual Harassment 80% 20%
Right to Privacy/Choice 71% 29%
Racial Discrimination/Affirmative Action 38% 63%
Age Discrimination 66% 32%
Disability Discrimination 77% 22%
Gender Discrimination 57% 43%
Governmental Discrimination 71% 29%
Total 66% 34%
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protection, O’Connor and Ginsburg ruled together the 
majority of the time (66%) to expand equal protection 
to minority groups. Second, even in instances of racial 
discrimination and affirmative action where O’Connor 
and Ginsburg part ways, they both still seek to expand 
equal protection. For O’Connor, equality means not 
establishing quotas through affirmative action as she 
find this ultimately leads to inequality. For Ginsburg, 
equality means the implementation of affirmative action 
as an effective way to bring about equality. Third, 
when looking at gender equality as a whole, Ginsburg 
and O’Connor rule in a manner that promotes women’s 
rights more than 90% of the time. These results support 
the idea that there is a distinctly feminine voice taken 
by justices in terms of equal protection under the law. 
However, as previously mentioned, the Feminine Voice 
Model does not apply to all aspects of law. Thus, the 
Attitudinal Model and Legal Model may apply to female 
justices in other areas of law such as fundamental rights 
of speech and expression, religious freedom, or regarding 
questions of federalism. 
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